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Abstract
Wage inequality fell in the 1990s and rose after 2000 among male workers in Japan. Nar-
rowing wage inequality during the 1990s can be accounted for by a fall in between-group
inequality resulting from a stable return to education and decreased returns to experience and
tenure. Widening wage inequality after 2000 can be accounted for by a rise in within-group
inequality resulting from changes in the returns to human capital as well as a relative increase
in educated and experienced workers.
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1 Introduction
The top 1% share of wage income, which was identical in the late 1960s between Japan and
the United States, doubled in the United States but remained stable in Japan from 1970 to 2000
(Moriguchi and Saez, 2007). Various measures of wage inequality did not rise in Japan over the
1980s and 1990s (Katz and Revenga, 1989; Katz, Loveman, and Blanchower, 1995; Kambayashi,
Kawaguchi, and Yokoyama, 2008), whereas a sizable increase in wage inequality has taken place in
the United States since the 1980s (Katz and Murphy, 1992; Juhn, Murphy, Pierce, 1993; Lemieux,
2006b; Autor, Katz, and Kearney, 2008). Because Japan and the United States were at the same
stage of industrialization by 1980 and implemented a comparable tax cut for the highest-income
workers after 1980, technological change and tax reform alone cannot explain the divergent trends
in wage inequality between the two countries (Moriguchi and Saez, 2007). Trends in Japan's wage
inequality have not been well understood yet.
This paper investigates the changes in Japan's wage structure between 1991 and 2008. During
the periods in Japan, real wages rose from 1991 to 2000 but fell from 2001 to 2008. The increase in
real wages in the 1990s was greater toward the lower percentiles of the wage distribution, and the
decline in the real wages after 2000 was smaller toward the upper percentiles with the exception of
female workers at the bottom end of the wage distribution (Figure 1). Therefore, wage inequality,
as measured by the variance of log wages, declined during the 1990s but started to rise after 2000
among male workers (Figure 2). Kambayashi, Kawaguchi, and Yamada (2011) show that the
moderate decline at the bottom end relative to in the middle of the wage distribution among female
workers between 1991 and 2003 can be accounted for by increased minimum wages. The aim of
this paper is to account for the reversal of trends in Japan's wage inequality that occurred among
male workers for the prolonged periods of economic recession in more recent years.
Trends in wage inequality are considered to be determined by interactions among supply, de-
mand, and institutions. On the demand side of the labor market, skill-biased technological change
has been pervasive across the world including Japan (Berman, Bound, and Machin, 1998; Sakurai
2001); while on the supply side, the educational attainment of the workforce has increased and
youth population has declined. Continuous progress in higher education is a common feature of
advanced East Asian countries such as Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan, where
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educational wage differentials, which can account for a large part of widening wage inequality in
the United States since the 1980s, were stable or declined over the 1980s and 1990s.1 Moreover, a
signicant decline in fertility rates, which is also common nowadays in advanced East Asian coun-
tries, started earlier in Japan; thus, it has reduced the number of young and inexperienced workers
in recent years. A highly developed system of Japanese internal labor markets is known as the
Japanese employment system. The Japanese employment system, as represented by long-term
employment and seniority wages, can be interpreted as a system of fostering rm-specic human
capital (Koike, 1988; Hashimoto and Raisian, 1985; Mincer and Higuchi, 1988).2 This system was
fully institutionalized during high-growth periods and still persists in Japan; however, it may have
been eroded in the waves of economic slowdown.
The analysis of this paper begins by documenting some important changes in Japan's wage
structure between 1991 and 2008. Since this study is interested in how the Japanese employment
system inuences the trends in wage inequality, the analysis focuses on full-time male workers, as
in the literature on the Japanese employment system,3 and uses the augmented Mincer (1974) wage
equation, in which human capital is determined by education attainment, general work experience,
and job tenure. The variance decomposition indicates that a fall in wage inequality in the 1990s is
accounted for by a fall in between-group inequality and that a rise in wage inequality after 2000
is accounted for by a rise in within-group inequality. The quantile regression approach reveals a
moderate convexication of the return to education in the middle and upper quantiles of the wage
distribution and a decline in the returns to experience and tenure in 2008 as compared to 1991.
The price of skill changes according to shifts in the supply of and demand for skills when work-
ers with different ages and education levels are imperfect substitutes (Card and Lemieux, 2001).
The increased share of the skilled workforce can directly raise wage inequality when wage dis-
1See Katz and Murphy (1992), Lemieux (2006a), and Autor, Katz, and Kearney (2008) for the United States;
Katz and Revenga (1989), Katz, Loveman, and Blanchower (1995), and Kambayashi, Kawaguchi, and Yokoyama
(2008) for Japan; Ryoo, Nam, and Carnoy (1993) for the Republic of Korea; Toh and Wong (1999) for Singapore; and
Gindling and Sun (2002) for Taiwan.
2Koike (1988) discusses the rationale for skill formation within rms. Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) show that
job tenure is longer, job turnover is less frequent, and that the earnings-tenure prole is steeper for male workers in
Japan than in the United States. Clark and Ogawa (1992) and Hashimoto and Raisian (1992) nd that the return to
tenure uctuates over the business cycle in Japan in the 1980s. Mincer and Higuchi (1988) attribute the higher return
to tenure in Japan to greater on-the-job training to keep up with rapid technological change.
3See Kambayashi, Kawaguchi, and Yamada (2011) for an analysis of wage inequality for female workers including
those who work part-time. The fraction of part-time workers is marginal for male workers.
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persion is higher for more educated and more experienced workers than for less educated and less
experienced workers (Lemieux, 2006b). In theory, an increase in the return to tenure in response
to accelerated technological progress can account for a third of rising residual inequality in the
United States (Violante, 2002). The return to tenure would decrease in response to decelerated
technological progress;4 thus, it may contribute to lowering wage inequality in Japan. However,
there has been no empirical research that examines the contributions of changes in the return to
tenure to trends in wage inequality or the implications of the erosion of the Japanese employment
system for trends in wage inequality. In the main analysis, we quantify the impact of changing
returns on elements in human capital and of the changing composition of the workforce on trends
in between- and within-group inequality. The rst effect is referred to as price effects and the sec-
ond as composition effects (Lemieux, 2006a, 2006b). We extend the random coefcients model in
Lemieux (2006a) by allowing for correlations among heterogeneous returns to education, experi-
ence, and tenure. Analysis of the random coefcients model indicates that a fall in between-group
inequality results from a stable return to education and decreased returns to experience and tenure,
while a rise in within-group inequality results from changes in the returns to human capital as well
as a relative increase in educated and experienced workers.
The next section documents key facts about changes in Japan's wage structure since the 1990s
and discusses changes in the bonus system and the promotion system.5 Section 3 describes the
econometric framework used to analyze the quantitative contribution of the changing returns on
elements in human capital and changing composition of the workforce to trends in wage inequal-
ity. Section 4 presents the results regarding heterogeneous returns to human capital and price and
composition effects on between- and within-group inequality, conrms the robustness of the nd-
ings against changes in the composition of industry and rm size, and discusses the impact of
deunionization on residual inequality. The nal section concludes.
4See Hayashi and Prescott (2002) for the slowdown of the total factor productivity growth in the 1990s.
5Figures A1 to A9 illustrate trends in Japan's wage inequality for both male and female workers including those
who work part-time. Lise and Yamada (2012) discuss on the details.
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2 Changes in Japan's Wage Structure
2.1 Data Description
We use repeated cross sections from the Basic Survey on Wage Structure (BSWS) from 1991 to
2008. The analysis focuses on full-time workers aged 15 to 59, because the mandatory retirement
age is typically 60. The sample size in each year ranges between 577,000 and 834,000 for male
workers and between 264,000 and 391,000 for female workers. Each worker is weighted by the
sampling weight in the analysis. Employee information is extracted from payroll records from
more than 51,000 establishments for every year. Board members are not included in the sample,
but there is neither top- nor bottom-coding. Hourly wages are calculated by dividing monthly
regular earnings plus one-twelfth of annual bonus payments by monthly hours of work and are
normalized by the consumer price index. Regular earnings comprise scheduled earnings, overtime
allowance, commutation allowance, family allowance, and perfect attendance allowance. Hours
of work include scheduled hours of work and overtime work. Education is categorized into junior
high school, high school, two-year college (including vocational school), and four-year college.
Among new hires, the proportion of university graduates rose from 31.7% to 55.5%, while
the proportion of high school graduates fell from 48.5% to 33.6% during the sample period. The
starting wage differentials between new college graduates and new high school graduates were
stable, ranging from 1.25 to 1.28 for male workers and from 1.26 to 1.32 for female workers.
The sample means of years of potential experience, which is age minus the number of years of
education minus six, range from 19.6 to 20.6 for male workers and from 16.4 to 18.5 for female
workers. Job tenure tends to be longer in Japan than in Anglo-Saxon countries such as Australia,
Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, but similar to that in France and Germany
between the late 1970s and the early 1990s (OECD, 1993). During the period from 1991 to 2008,
the sample means of job tenure, which is the length of time with the current employer, range from
12.1 to 13.1 for male workers and from 6.70 to 8.29 for female workers. Job tenure decreased
slightly for younger male cohorts with university degrees. Mean job tenure at the age of 35 for
male university graduate workers born in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s was 9.55, 9.68, and 8.69
years, respectively.
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2.2 Trends in Wage Inequality
We begin analysis by decomposing overall inequality into between- and within-group inequality,
as in Juhn, Murphy, and Pierce (1993) and Lemieux (2006b). We consider a log wage equation
such that wit = Xitt + uit, where X is a vector of skills determined by education dummies
and fourth-order polynomials in experience and tenure, i is an index for individuals, and t is an
index for years, in order to account for the impact of progress in higher education, a decline in
youth population, and the erosion of the Japanese employment system on the changes in the wage
structure. The variance of log wages can be decomposed into two components.
Vt (wit) = 0tVt (Xit) t + Et [Vt (witjXit)] ; (1)
where the rst component represents the variance of log wages between skill groups, and the sec-
ond component represents the variance of log wages within skill groups. The augmented Mincer-
type wage equation ts the wage structure of Japanese male workers remarkably well. The R2
obtained from the log wage regressions ranges from 0.47 to 0.56 during the sample period. The
inclusion of full interaction terms among education, experience, and tenure increases the R2 only
marginally. The trends in wage inequality described below remain unchanged even after adding
the full interaction terms.
Figure 2 illustrates trends in overall, between-group, and within-group inequality separately
for male and female workers. Among male workers, between-group inequality declined over the
1990s and then uctuated after 2000, while within-group inequality stayed nearly constant in the
early 1990s and increased after the mid-1990s. Therefore, a fall in overall inequality in the 1990s is
explained by a fall in between-group inequality, while a rise in within-group inequality after 2000 is
explained by a rise in within-group inequality. Among female workers, between-group inequality
remained stable, while within-group inequality declined in the early 1990s and remained stable
after the mid-1990s. Changes in wage inequality are less pronounced for female workers than for
male workers.
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2.3 Changes in Wage Proles
Trends in between-group inequality reect changes in the shape of wage proles. The analysis
hereafter focuses on male workers. Figure 3 depicts predicted log hourly wages along with educa-
tion, experience, and tenure in 1991 and 2008, holding other characteristics at their means. Each
wage prole is obtained from quantile regressions of the log wage equation described above for the
10th, 50th, and 90th quantiles. Figure 4 illustrates changes in the workforce share by education,
experience, and tenure to see the shifts in the supply of skills.
The wage-education prole is approximately linear at the lower quantile but is more convex-
shaped for the upper quantile in more recent years. Convexication of the wage-education prole
implies a relative increase in the demand for skilled workers with university degrees. However, the
extent to which the wage-education prole is convexied is far more prominent for every quantile
in the United States (Lemieux, 2006b). The relatively stable return to education in Japan can
be explained by a rise in the supply of educated workforce. During the periods between 1991 and
2008 in Japan, the proportion of university and two-year college graduate workers respectively rose
from 25.0% to 36.4% and from 5.1% to 10.5%, whereas the proportion of junior high and high
school graduate workers respectively fell from 18.0% to 5.3% and from 51.9% to 47.7%. This
phenomenon mirrors the rising return to education and the stagnation of higher education after the
late 1970s in Anglo-Saxon countries such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States
(Card and Lemieux, 2001). The relatively stable return to education despite a substantial rise in
the supply of skills can be interpreted as indicating a substantial rise in the demand for skills in
Japan.
The wage-experience prole is concave-shaped. The shape of wage-experience prole is atter
especially at the lower quantile, and the turning points are located earlier in 1991 than in 2008. The
mechanism for this is the same as that behind a reduction in the relative wages of baby boomers
in the United States (Welch, 1979). Decreased return to experience can be explained by a relative
decrease in inexperienced workers. The number of inexperienced workers relatively decreased in
Japan for two reasons. First, the number of younger cohorts entering the labor market decreased
in recent years because of lower fertility rates. Second, the second-generation baby boomers, who
were born in the early 1970s, reached middle age.
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The wage-tenure prole is steeper than the wage-experience prole, indicating the importance
of on-the-job training or the prevalence of deferred compensation contract in the Japanese labor
market. In either case, the seniority wage system remains rmly, as can be seen from a monotonic
increase in log wages up to 30 years of job tenure for every quantile. The slope of the wage-tenure
prole, however, decreased around 10 years of job tenure in 2008 as compared to 1991. A fall in job
tenure has not yet clearly appeared, despite a recent moderate decline in job tenure among younger
cohorts with university degrees. The uctuation of the proportions of groups whose tenure ranging
from 1 to 5, from 6 to 10, and from 11 to 15 is attributable to the aging of the second-generation
baby boomers. The decline in the slope of the wage-tenure prole can be explained by sluggish
technological change and the extension of the mandatory retirement age. As technological change
slows, the skills acquired on the job become obsolete more slowly, rms invest less in on-the-job
training, and the return to tenure declines (Mincer and Higuchi, 1988). Moreover, as the mandatory
retirement age increases from 60 to a higher age,6 the wage-tenure prole will be atter (Lazear,
1979; Clark and Ogawa, 1992).7 A change in the wage-tenure prole could potentially occur by a
change in the distribution of unobserved ability by tenure. If there were a trend for workers with
high ability to switch their jobs, the wage-tenure prole would be atter. However, the Japanese
job market seems to undergo the opposite change. Figure 5 indicates that the declining pattern of
wage changes over the life cycle does not vary over time and shifts downward relative to the 1991
level.8 There is thus no evidence that a decline in the return to tenure results from an increase in
job separation.
6According to the Survey on Employment Management between 1992 and 2004, the proportion of rms with
retirement system ranges between 88.2% and 96.8%. Among the rms with retirement system, the proportion of rms
where the mandatory retirement age is 59 or under decreased from 23.4% in 1992 to 0.7% in 2004.
7A negative association between the return to tenure and the retirement age can arise in human capital theory as
well as deferred compensation theory, because old workers need less updating of their skill and are more likely to
delay their retirement as technological change slows (Mincer and Higuchi, 1988).
8In this gure, the wage changes are estimated by interval regressions using repeated cross sections from the Survey
on Employment Trends in the years 1991, 1996, 2001, and 2006, in which the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
collects information about changes in the wages of job switchers by several categories. The sample size for each year
ranges between 14,400 and 15,300.
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2.4 Trends in Workforce Composition
The proportion of educated and experienced workers has increased in recent years (Figure 4). Such
a change in the composition of the workforce can mechanically raise within-group (residual) in-
equality (Lemieux, 2006b). Table 1 summarizes workforce share by education, experience, and
tenure for the years 1991, 2000, and 2008 in more details along with residual variance to dis-
cuss the relation between workforce composition and within-group inequality. On the one hand,
residual variance increases with education and experience (Table 1, Panel A). This implies that
the increased share of educated and experienced workforce is a factor in raising within-group in-
equality. On the other hand, residual variance does not increase with tenure (Table 1, Panel B).
This implies that, even though it may be inconclusive whether there was a change in long-term
employment, a change in tenure composition would not have a signicant impact on within-group
inequality. Moreover, residual variance increased in most of the cells from 1991 to 2008, indicating
that composition effects are not the only explanation for a rise in within-group inequality. Section
4 presents the quantitative contribution of changing price as well as changing workforce compo-
sition to the trends in within-group inequality, followed by the specications of the conditional
variance in equation (1) in Section 3.
2.5 The Bonus System
The bonus system prevalent in Japanese rms is best described by a shared return to specic
investment, as evidenced by the bonus ratio increasing with tenure and uctuating over the business
cycle (Hashimoto, 1979; Hart and Kawasaki, 1999).9 The proportion of workers who receive
bonuses fell from 92.2% in 1991 to 83.8% in 2008, and the ratio of bonus payments to regular
wages fell from 28.6% in 1991 to 21.6% in 2008. The fall in the bonus ratio implies a change in
the seniority wage system but does not counter the trend toward incentive pay.
Recognizing that the log of total wages per hour can be written as w = log r + log (1 + b/ r),
where r denotes regular wages per hour, and b denotes bonus payments per hour, we perform the
regression of log regular wages (log r) and the bonus ratio (log (1 + b/ r)) separately. Figure 6
illustrates the proles of regular wages and the bonus ratio according to education, experience, and
9Hart and Kawasaki (1999) discuss competing hypotheses and their empirical relevance.
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tenure in 1991 and 2008. The shapes of the wage-education prole and wage-experience prole
are similar between total wages and regular wages, but the wage-tenure prole is steeper for total
wages than for regular wages at each quantile (Figure 6, Panel A). The difference in the wage-
tenure prole between total wages and regular wages can be explained by a steeper bonus-tenure
prole (Figure 6, Panel B). The bonus ratio prole shifts downward especially at the lower quantile,
whereas the regular wage prole shifts slightly upward between 1991 and 2008, indicating that a
reduction in bonus payments plays a major role in declining real wages after 2000. Consistent with
human capital theory in Hashimoto (1979, 1981), the bonus ratio increases with education and
tenure, but not experience. Therefore, the bonus can be interpreted as an incentive for acquiring
specic human capital. The downward shift in the bonus-tenure prole results in a decline in the
return to tenure.
2.6 The Promotion System
The promotion system in Japan, as represented by late selection, is incorporated into the Japanese
employment system (Hart and Kawasaki, 1999). Late selection promotes the acquisition of rm-
specic human capital, facilitates skill transfer from senior to junior workers, and maintains strong
competition among workers who enter the rm in the same year, at the risk of job turnover by
new and talented workers. Recent changes in external environments, such as the speed of techno-
logical change and the degree of market competition, might affect the internal structure of rms.
For example, early promotion could potentially weaken the effect of tenure on wages. However,
neither the proportion of workers in managerial positions nor the speed of promotion changed sub-
stantially. The proportions of division chiefs, section chiefs, subsection chiefs, other chiefs, and
foreman, respectively, changed only from 2.1% to 2.4%, from 5.1% to 5.8%, from 4.6% to 4.9%,
from 4.9% to 4.7%, and from 1.8% to 1.5% between 1991 and 2008.
3 Econometric Framework
In this section, we present an empirical framework to decompose between- and within-group in-
equality into price and composition effects. We specify the log of hourly wages for an individual i
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in year t by the augmented Mincer-type wage equation with random coefcients:
wit = it + sitit + xitit + zitit;
where s is a vector of education dummies, x is a vector of polynomials of degree four in experi-
ence, and z is a vector of polynomials of degree four in job tenure. Both the intercept and slope
coefcients are heterogeneous across individuals and time. For the purpose of estimation, we im-
pose restrictions on the vector of random coefcients such that it = t + tai, it = t + tbi,
it = t + tci, and it = t + tdi with Et (jij sit; xit; zit) = 0, and Vt (jij sit; xit; zit) = 2j ,
Et (jikij sit; xit; zit) = ij for j; k = a; b; c; d, and j 6= k. The log wage equation can then be
written as
wit = t + sitt + xitt + zitt + uit;
where the error term is uit = tai+ sittbi+xittci+ zittdi. The coefcients represent the mean
effects on log wages in year t, i.e., t = Et (it), t = Et (it), and t = Et (it).
The mean and variance of the log wages are given by
Et (witj sit; xit; zit) = t + sitt + xitt + zitt; (2)
Vt (witj sit; xit; zit) = 2a2t + 2b (sitt)2 + 2c (xitt)2 + 2d (zitt)2
+ab (2t  sitt) + ac (2t  xitt) + ad (2t  zitt)
+bc (2sitt  xitt) + bd (2sitt  zitt) + cd (2xitt  zitt) : (3)
This framework allows the returns to human capital to be correlated and nests the random coef-
cients model developed by Lemieux (2006a) as a special case when ij = 0. Equation (2) expresses
the relation of between-group inequality to the price of skill and the composition of the workforce,
while equation (3) expresses the relation of within-group (residual) inequality to the price of skill
and the composition of the workforce. Between-group inequality will increase with the price of
skill. Residual inequality will also increase with the price of skill under the restrictions ij = 0,
and the size of price effects on within-group inequality is proportional to the size of variance of the
returns to human capital. In the more general case, however, the price effects on residual inequality
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depend on the size and sign of covariance as well as the size of variance of the returns to human
capital. Suppose that the return to general human capital is negatively correlated with the return
to specic human capital. A decline in the return to experience entails an increase in the return to
tenure; thus, it will not necessarily lower residual inequality. Similarly, an increase in the return to
education will not necessarily raise residual inequality. Therefore, ignoring the interaction effect
can cause a substantial bias in estimating price effects on within-group inequality.
We estimate the system of the two equations jointly by the generalized method of moments
(GMM). The moment conditions (2) and (3) can be expressed as
Et (uitj sit; xit; zit) = 0
Et
 
u2it   Vt (witj sit; xit; zit)
 sit; xit; zit = 0
These conditional moment conditions imply a number of unconditional moment conditions. While
no excluded instrument is used for equation (2), the interaction terms between year dummies and
mp for p = 1; 2; 4; 6; 8, where m includes education dummies, years of potential experience,
and job tenure, are used as instruments for equation (3). The mean returns to human capital are
identied from the rst set of moment conditions, and the variance and covariance of the returns
to human capital are identied from the second set of moment conditions. We adopt the two-step
GMM and use the 1991, 2000, and 2008 BSWS data to examine the reversal of trends in Japan's
wage inequality.
An advantage of this approach developed by Lemieux (2006a) is to enable us to isolate the
impact of changing returns on elements in human capital on between- and within-group inequal-
ity. After estimating a set of parameters
 
t; t; t; t; 
2
j ; jk

for t = 1991; 2000; 2008, j; k =
a; b; c; d, and j 6= k, we can quantify the impact of changes in the return to education, experience,
or tenure on changes in between- and within-group inequality by comparing the counterfactual
wages if there has been no change in the return to education, experience, or tenure since the base
year 1991 or 2000 to the actual wages in the year 2000 or 2008. The counterfactual wages can be
obtained by replacing the estimated coefcients of education, experience, or tenure with those at
the base year level. Price effects can then be calculated from the sum of the three effects. Com-
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position effects can nally be calculated as the residual of total predicted changes in between-
and within-group inequality. Equations (2) and (3) are respectively used to quantify the impact on
between- and within-group inequality.
4 Results
4.1 Price and Composition Effects
Table 2 summarizes the GMM estimates of the mean, variance, and covariance of heterogeneous
returns to human capital with and without the restrictions ij = 0 for j; k = a; b; c; d, and j 6= k in
equation (3). The estimated mean returns to human capital fell from 1991 to 2000 and rose from
2000 to 2008, except that the return to high school education fell steadily. Comparing the estimates
by the unrestricted model in 1991 to those in 2008, the return to high school education fell by 0.50
percentage points (8.5%), the return to two-year college education remained almost unchanged,
and the return to university education rose by 0.22 percentage points (2.8%). Since the returns
to experience and tenure also vary in a non-linear fashion, the direction of its change depends on
where the returns are evaluated. The return to experience increased for inexperienced workers
with less than about 10 years of experience but decreased for experienced workers with more than
15 years of experience. Changes in the return to tenure are more complex. The return to tenure
increased in the 1990s and decreased after 2000 for workers with 5 years of tenure, decreased in the
1990s and increased after 2000 for workers with 10 years of tenure, and monotonically decreased
for workers with 20 years of tenure. The sign of price effects depends on the distribution of
experience (tenure) and the rate of increase or decrease in the return to experience (tenure). As
will be seen from price effects on between-group inequality without the restrictions in Table 3,
the decline in the return to experience for experienced workers dominates the rise in the return to
experience for inexperienced workers from 1991 to 2000 but is weakly dominated after 2000. The
decline in the return to tenure dominates the rise in the return to tenure both from 1991 to 2000
and from 2000 to 2008.
Consistent with the descriptive analysis in Table 1, the estimated variance of the returns to hu-
man capital implies that residual inequality rises signicantly with education and experience, but
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marginally with tenure. The estimated covariance of the returns to human capital is all individu-
ally, highly signicant, indicating a strong rejection of the null hypothesis that the covariance of
the returns to human capital is zero. The size of the estimated covariance between intercept and
slope coefcients is very small, but the size of the estimated covariance of the returns to human
capital is signicant. The return to education moves in the same direction with the return to experi-
ence, whereas the return to tenure changes inversely with the returns to education and experience.
This suggests that the demand for educated workers would have the same trend as the demand
for experienced workers and that the demand for general human capital would have an opposite
trend from the demand for specic human capital. Thus, education may substitute general experi-
ence, whereas specic human capital acquired on the job may complement general human capital
accumulated through education and general experience.
Between-group inequality declined over the 1990s and then uctuated after 2000, while within-
group inequality stayed nearly constant in the 1990s and then rose after 2000 (Figure 2). Table
3 decomposes the changes in between- and within-group inequality into price and composition
effects based on the regression results with and without the restrictions in Table 2. A fall in
between-group inequality in the 1990s results from price effects, due to a decline in the returns
to education, experience, and tenure. A stable within-group inequality in the 1990s results from
countervailing effects between negative price effects and positive composition effects due to a rel-
ative increase in educated and experienced workers. The countervailing forces between price and
composition effects on within-group inequality are substantially greater without the restrictions.
A stable between-group inequality after 2000 results from positive composition effects counter-
vailing negative price effects due to a decline in the return to tenure. The sign of price effects on
within-group inequality changed after 2000. A rise in within-group inequality after 2000 results
from price and composition effects. Changes in within-group inequality are more pronounced after
2000, because price and composition effects work in the same direction. To summarize, narrowing
overall inequality in the 1990s can be accounted for by a decline in between-group inequality re-
sulting from decreased returns to human capital, while widening overall inequality after 2000 can
be accounted for by the increased share of educated and experienced workforce as well as changes
in the returns to human capital. The assumption of no correlation among heterogeneous returns
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substantially understates price effects on within-group inequality. When relaxing this assumption,
an increase in the return to education entails an increase in the return to experience and vice versa,
and a decrease in the return to tenure entails an increase in the return to education and experience.
Therefore, without the restrictions, the estimated price effects on within-group inequality arising
from an increase in the returns to education and experience become greater, and the price effects
on within-group inequality arising from a decrease in the return to tenure are not negative but pos-
itive. The size of price and composition effects on within-group inequality is then quantitatively
comparable between 2000 and 2008.
4.2 Industry and Firm Size
Figure 7 illustrates changes in workforce share by industry and rm size. The share of the work-
force in the manufacturing sector fell from 36.8% to 31.5% between 1991 and 2008, while the
shares of the workforce in service and other sectors respectively rose from 2.6% to 7.1% and from
22.9% to 26.6%. There is no clear trend for the distribution of rm size, but the share of the
workforce in large rms with more than 5,000 employees decreased until 2004 and then increased.
Hashimoto and Raisian (1985, 1992) and Clark and Ogawa (1992) discuss a difference in wage
proles by rm size, and Mincer and Higuchi (1988) discuss a difference in wage proles by in-
dustry. The changes in wage proles could potentially be driven by the changes in the composition
of industry and rm size. To examine this possibility, we perform the weighted least squares re-
gression, in which observations are weighted so as to hold the distribution of industry and rm size
xed at the 1991 level. Let Q denote a set of dummy variables for industries and rm size and  0
the reference year 1991. Following DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux (1996), the weighting factor is
given by
 t (Q) =
Pr (Qj t =  0)
Pr (Qj t = ) =
Pr (t =  0jQ)/ Pr (t =  0)
Pr (t =  jQ)/ Pr (t = ) ; (4)
where the conditional probabilities are estimated from the logit model. We nd that the shape of
the wage proles obtained from the log wage regressions does not change regardless of weighting.
Therefore, changes in the composition of industry and rm size cannot account for changes in
wage proles discussed above.
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4.3 Labor Union
Japanese labor unions are typically formed at the level of a company or establishment. In most
cases, both white- and blue-collar workers join the same labor union under the union shop agree-
ment. The enterprise union plays a role in sharing information and negotiating a mutually accept-
able settlement on rm-specic working conditions (Hart and Kawasaki, 1999). Japanese unions
do not represent any particular skill group but perform functions similar to Western unions at the
industry level in terms of reducing the wage dispersion among unionized workers. Therefore, re-
cent trends toward deunionization may explain a rise in within-group inequality. Figure 8 plots the
level and change of residual variance and unionization rates by industry.10 Despite a large disper-
sion of unionization rates ranging from 9.9% to 68.0% in level and from 21.7 to 3.0 percentage
points in change, neither the level nor the change of residual variance varies so signicantly by
industry, indicating that deunionization plays a minor role in increasing within-group inequality.
4.4 Occupation
The recent polarization of the U.S. labor market motivates the analysis of the task-based model
(Autor, Levy, Murnane, 2003). Lemieux (2008) nds a positive correlation between the change in
residual variance and the level of education by occupation in the United States. However, we did
not nd any clear pattern in Japan, when plotting the change in the residual variance along with
education, experience, and tenure by occupation. Further analysis of this issue is left for future
work.
5 Conclusion
This paper has documented changes in Japan's wage structure between 1991 and 2008 and quanti-
ed the impact of changing returns on elements in human capital and of the changing composition
of the workforce on trends in Japan's wage inequality. A decline in the returns to experience and
tenure resulted in narrowing between-group inequality in the 1990s. The decreased return to tenure
has appeared in the form of a decrease in bonus payments. The increased share of the educated and
10The unionization rates are from the Basic Survey on Labour Unions.
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experienced workforce, owing to progress in higher education and a decline in youth population,
resulted in widening within-group inequality. After 2000, the return to education was moderately
convexied in the upper quantiles of the wage distribution, and an increase in the return to expe-
rience for inexperienced workers exceeded a decrease in the return to experience for experienced
workers. These price effects also contributed to increasing within-group inequality. When allow-
ing for correlations among heterogeneous returns to education, experience, and tenure, the size of
the estimated price and composition effects on within-group inequality is comparable. The rever-
sal of trends in Japan's wage inequality can be attributed to the changes in the sign of price effects
and the relative magnitude of price and composition effects.
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Table 1: Workforce Composition and Residual Inequality  
Workforce Share (%) Residual Variance 
1991 2000 2008 1991 2000 2008 
Panel A: by Education and Experience 
Junior High School 
0–10 1.2 0.6 0.4 0.097 0.084 0.088 
11–20 1.5 1.1 0.8 0.105 0.102 0.107 
21–30 5.1 1.4 1.0 0.098 0.117 0.121 
31+ 10.4 6.9 3.2 0.119 0.120 0.137 
High School 
0–10 14.1 11.0 8.1 0.063 0.062 0.079 
11–20 12.7 13.2 13.5 0.083 0.080 0.095 
21–30 15.2 12.3 12.7 0.108 0.107 0.123 
31+ 9.8 14.0 13.4 0.153 0.138 0.155 
Two-year College 
0–10 2.5 4.0 3.3 0.052 0.054 0.069 
11–20 1.4 2.7 4.2 0.090 0.079 0.094 
21–30 0.8 1.6 2.0 0.141 0.122 0.134 
31+ 0.3 0.8 1.0 0.191 0.145 0.186 
Four-year College or above 
0–10 10.1 11.0 11.3 0.072 0.069 0.086 
11–20 8.4 9.7 11.8 0.135 0.130 0.152 
21–30 5.0 7.3 9.1 0.158 0.169 0.202 
31+ 1.6 2.5 4.3 0.218 0.211 0.242 
Panel B: by Education and Tenure 
Junior High School 
0 1.2 0.6 0.4 0.104 0.090 0.088 
1–5 3.5 1.9 1.4 0.104 0.106 0.111 
6–15 4.3 2.4 1.3 0.106 0.105 0.117 
16+ 9.0 5.0 2.3 0.116 0.128 0.146 
High School 
0 4.4 3.2 3.8 0.087 0.089 0.097 
1–5 14.3 12.9 13.5 0.091 0.096 0.117 
6–15 14.4 16.4 12.7 0.092 0.089 0.112 
16+ 18.7 18.0 17.8 0.110 0.112 0.123 
Two-year College 
0 0.6 0.7 1.0 0.068 0.075 0.084 
1–5 1.9 3.1 3.5 0.071 0.073 0.105 
6–15 1.5 3.5 3.4 0.088 0.072 0.098 
16+ 1.1 1.8 2.7 0.122 0.118 0.112 
Four-year College or above 
0 1.8 1.9 2.9 0.134 0.150 0.153 
1–5 7.5 8.3 10.7 0.106 0.123 0.163 
6–15 8.7 11.0 10.7 0.117 0.114 0.146 
16+ 7.1 9.4 12.2 0.133 0.132 0.155 
  
21 
 
Table 2: GMM Estimates of Heterogeneous Returns to Human Capital 
Restricted Model Unrestricted Model 
Returns to Human Capital Returns to Human Capital 
1991 2000 2008 1991 2000 2008 
Mean    
Education    
high school 
0.0616 
(0.0006)
0.0584 
(0.0009)
0.0539 
(0.0014)
0.0587 
(0.0006)
0.0550 
(0.0009) 
0.0537 
(0.0009)
two-year college 
0.0623 
(0.0006)
0.0585 
(0.0008)
0.0609 
(0.0010)
0.0603 
(0.0006)
0.0574 
(0.0007) 
0.0599 
(0.0007)
four-year college 
0.0796 
(0.0003)
0.0762 
(0.0005)
0.0805 
(0.0007)
0.0783 
(0.0003)
0.0749 
(0.0004) 
0.0805 
(0.0005)
Experience    
10 years 
0.0201 
(0.0002)
0.0216 
(0.0003)
0.0221 
(0.0003)
0.0208 
(0.0002)
0.0217 
(0.0002) 
0.0220 
(0.0003)
20 years 
0.0086 
(0.0002)
0.0065 
(0.0002)
0.0053 
(0.0002)
0.0091 
(0.0002)
0.0068 
(0.0002) 
0.0076 
(0.0002)
30 years 
–0.0018 
(0.0002)
–0.0033 
(0.0003)
–0.0053 
(0.0003)
–0.0028 
(0.0002)
–0.0032 
(0.0003) 
–0.0046 
(0.0003)
Tenure    
5 years 
0.0338 
(0.0002)
0.0356 
(0.0003)
0.0297 
(0.0003)
0.0330 
(0.0002)
0.0342 
(0.0002) 
0.0292 
(0.0003)
10 years 
0.0243 
(0.0002)
0.0187 
(0.0003)
0.0232 
(0.0003)
0.0236 
(0.0002)
0.0189 
(0.0003) 
0.0222 
(0.0003)
20 years 
0.0269 
(0.0002)
0.0227 
(0.0002)
0.0217 
(0.0003)
0.0265 
(0.0002)
0.0229 
(0.0002) 
0.0209 
(0.0003)
Variance  
intercept 
0.0009 
(0.0000) 
0.0022 
(0.0005) 
education 
0.0946 
(0.0025) 
0.3102 
(0.0098) 
experience 
0.3442 
(0.0049) 
0.8501 
(0.0314) 
tenure 
0.0097 
(0.0013) 
0.1818 
(0.0047) 
Covariance  
intercept, education 
 
–0.0197 
(0.0007) 
intercept, experience 
 
–0.0226 
(0.0012) 
intercept, tenure 
 
0.0093 
(0.0009) 
education, experience 
 
0.3570 
(0.0119) 
education, tenure 
 
–0.1596 
(0.0055) 
experience, tenure 
 
–0.3056 
(0.0151) 
Notes: The sample size is 2,119,768. Standard errors are in parentheses. The base group for education dummies is 
junior high school graduates.  
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Table 3: Price and Composition Effects on Between- and Within-Group Inequality 
Restricted Model Unrestricted Model 
  
Between-
group 
Within-
group 
Total 
Between-
group 
Within-
group 
Total 
1991–2000 1991–2000 
Price effects: –0.0160 –0.0030 –0.0191 –0.0155 –0.0704 –0.0859
education –0.0019 –0.0010 –0.0029 –0.0018 0.0391 –0.0373
experience –0.0028 –0.0020 –0.0048 –0.0029 –0.0158 –0.0187
tenure –0.0114 0.0000 –0.0114 –0.0108 –0.0936 –0.1044
intercept  –0.0000 –0.0000 –0.0001 –0.0001
Composition effects: –0.0013 0.0048 0.0034 –0.0014 0.0678 0.0664
Total –0.0174 0.0017 –0.0157  –0.0169 –0.0026 –0.0195
2000–2008 2000–2008 
Price effects: –0.0046 0.0085 0.0039 –0.0039 0.0135 0.0096
education 0.0058 0.0010 0.0068 0.0060 0.0034 0.0094
experience –0.0012 0.0082 0.0070 0.0012 0.0062 0.0074
tenure –0.0093 –0.0005 –0.0098 –0.0111 0.0039 –0.0072
intercept  –0.0001 –0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
Composition effects: 0.0073 0.0142 0.0215 0.0070 0.0137 0.0207
Total 0.0026 0.0228 0.0254 0.0031 0.0272 0.0303
1991–2008 1991–2008 
Price effects: –0.0199 0.0055 –0.0144 –0.0188 0.0096 –0.0092
education 0.0036 –0.0002 0.0034 0.0040 0.0012 0.0052
experience –0.0037 0.0063 0.0026 –0.0013 0.0056 0.0043
tenure –0.0197 –0.0005 –0.0203 –0.0214 0.0028 –0.0186
intercept  –0.0001 –0.0001 0.0000 0.0000
Composition effects: 0.0051 0.0190 0.0241 0.0050 0.0151 0.0201
Total –0.0147 0.0245 0.0098 –0.0138 0.0247 0.0109
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Figure 1: Changes in log Real Hourly Wages by Percentile 
 
 
Figure 2: Trends in the Variance of log Hourly Wages 
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Figure 3: Wage Profiles for the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles 
  
 
Figure 4: Trends in the Workforce Share by Education, Experience, and Tenure 
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Figure 5: Percentage Wage Changes Associated with Job Changes 
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Figure 6: Profiles of Regular Wages and the Bonus Ratio for the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles 
Panel A: ln ݎ 
 
Panel B: lnሺ1 ൅ ݎ ݕ⁄ ሻ 
 
Notes: The log of total wages per hour can be decomposed as ݓ ൌ ln ݎ ൅ lnሺ1 ൅ ܾ ݎ⁄ ሻ, where r denotes regular wages 
per hour, and b denotes bonus payments per hour.  
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Figure 7: Trends in Workforce Share by Industry and Firm Size 
 
 
Figure 8: Within-Group Inequality and Unionization Rates by Industry 
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Figure A1: Median Wages, Hours Worked, and Earnings for Men and Women 
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Figure A2: Wage Inequality for Men and Women 
 
Figure A3: Education, Experience, Gender Wage Premia, and Residual Wage Inequality for Men and 
Women 
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Figure A4: Inequality in Labor Supply and Earnings of Men and Women 
 
Figure A5: Comparison of Time-Series Mean and Variance of Earnings by Gender in the BSWS and FIES. 
Normalized to Zero in 1994
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Figure A6: Wages and Hours over the Life Cycle  
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Figure A7: Life Cycle Inequality 
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Figure A8: Life Cycle Inequality in Earnings, after Controlling for Year and Cohort Effects 
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Figure A9: Comparison of Life-Cycle Mean and Variance of Earnings by Gender in the BSWS and FIES 
(a) BSWS 
 
(b) FIES 
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